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The Reasonable and the Rational Capacities in Political Analysis

EMILY HAUPTMANN

The authors employ Rawls's distinction between the reasonable and rational capacities to show why and how rational choice theory cannot provide adequate explanations of human behavior. According to Rawls, the reasonable capacity, associated with the concept of right and the sense of justice, is no less fundamental a moral power than is the rational, associated with the concept of the good and self-interest. Since rational choice analysis presupposes the primacy of rationality, however, those who rely upon it see persons' expressions of conceptions of right as expressions of rationality. The authors argue that in cases ranging from prisoner's dilemma experiments to the analysis of social institutions, rational choice theorists encounter expressions of the reasonable but cannot, because of their theoretical commitments, take systematic account of them. The article concludes by making some tentative suggestions about the form political analysis based on both the reasonable and the rational capacities might take.

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